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Abstract 
Introducing negotiation in goods & works procurement is very important to improving 
performance of the public money. Before 2003 there were no procurement regulations in 
Bangladesh. In fact immediate after independence, Bangladesh Forms 2908 and 2911 
ware used for public procurement. The Public Procurement Regulations 2003 was first 
introduced in September 2003 under the title ―The Public Procurement Regulations 
2003‖. and Jatio Sangshad (National Parliament) had passed ―The Public Procurement 
Act 200 6‖. Public Procurement Act-2006 and sub-sequent Public Procurement Rules-
2008 (PPA-2006 and  PPR-2008) was come into effective on January 1, 2008. So a 
transformational change had  occured in the field of Public Procurement after enactment 
of Act and Rules. All government organization now following PPR. During procuring 
and implementation of public works, government official have to face a lots of problem 
in tender processing. As estimated cost not disclosed to the bidder as well as unit price 
varying due to working situation the bidder fail to conceive the actual cost. So that there 
offered price varied from  estimated cost. If the offered price above then estimated cost 
and procurer normally keeping the approval authority up to the estimated cost, 
complexity arises. Then it needs higher level approval or re-tendering which is time and 
cost consuming. In service procurement, it was found that minimum re-invitation or 
higher level approval required as there have a scope of negotiation. If there any limitation 
in tender processing due to fund shortage than the offered or coated price can be recast 
within the budget limit following some guideline. My investigation found that if there 
any scope of introducing negotiation in goods and work procurement process then the 
number of re-tender will be reduce. So that, development project will complete within 
limited time and budget. However, suppliers must be advised that this is the purpose of 
the dialogue. Variations may arise during the tendering process and the purchasing and 
supply management professional should ensure that all suppliers receive exactly the same 
information and, as far as possible, at the same time. 
 
Key Words: Introducing negotiation, Procurement. 
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Chapter One 
1.1 Intorduction  
There was no Public Procurement act and rules or  any uniform regulations in Bangladesh 
before the enactment of Public Procurement Regulations 2003. In fact immediately after 
independence Bangladesh inherited few customs, procedures and forms introduced by 
British Government and followed by public sector since then. Forms 2908 and 2911 are 
used for public procurement processing since our independence which were introduced in 
August 1929 and November 1929 by the then British Government. The Public 
Procurement Regulations 200 3 was first introduced in September 2003 under the title 
―The Public Procurement Regulations 2003‖ with the Technical Assistance of IDA. This 
is the first Public Procurement Regulations of the country. Before that Public 
Procurement done by using various documents/ procedures like (1) the public works 
department code, (2) the manual of office procedure, (3) Economic Relation Division’s 
(ERD) guide line for donor assisted development projects, etc.. The Public Procurement 
Regulations 2003 replaced all of them. 
In continuation of the reform process, Jatio Sangshad (National Parliament) passed ―The 
Public Procurement Act’ 200 6‖. Public Procurement Act 2006 and sub-sequent Public 
Procurement Rules 2008. PPA 2006 and  PPR 2008 was come into effective on January 
1, 2008. So a transformational change had  occured in the field of Public Procurement 
after enactment of Act and Rules.  
Local Government Engineering Department (LGED) is a government organization under 
the Ministry of Local Government Rural Development and Cooperatives (LGRD&C). It 
is one of the major government organizations that deal with the construction of different 
infrastructure/ physical facilities under different projects. LGED is the pioneer in the 
development of rural infrastructure of Bangladesh that has been playing a leading role in 
the implementation of government achieving millennium development goal (MDG). A 
strong base of standards and professionalism has been developed in the LGED over the 
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years of experience.  It has prestigious accomplishment in the field of rural development 
through construction of roads, bridges, small scale water resource project (command area 
less than 1000 hectors).Primary school building, infrastructure development in urban area 
etc. LGED constructed some landmark structures like flyover, bridge, cyclone shelter, UP 
complex etc. Similarly other engineering organizations have some works that meet the 
national impotency as well as architectural beauty. In Bangladesh nearly 80% of national 
development budget spend by the engineering organizations. However, t here was wide 
criticism against them is that they could not implement projects within stipulated budget 
and within predetermined time. The problems of time and cost overrun were frequently 
seen in different construction projects.  Engineering Departments had been using so 
called form-2911 and form-2908 for their procurement before enactment of PPR-2003, 
PPA-2006 and PPR-2008. At present under these rules, procurement of service enjoying 
negotiation facilities, reduce time and processing cost by avoiding re-tendering the 
procurement process. But works and goods procurement we unable to introduce 
negotiation, causing delay in tender processing and re-tendering frequently. Now we can 
assess the impact of negotiation on works and goods procurement. 
1.2 Scope: 
Local Government Engineering Department (LGED) is the Government’s biggest 
infrastructural development agency. Apart from the public sector, it also undertakes 
projects for autonomous bodies.  
One of major areas of Local Government Engineering Department’s (LGED) 
involvement is construction, repair & maintenance of rural roads and road structure, 
drainage & retaining structure, primary school building, local government buildings. The 
expenditure involved in this sector amounts to around 2500 crore taka yearly, which is 
substantial 
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This is the particular area of expenditure which will be under study during this research 
work, in order to find out ways of reducing tendering cost and time saving to complete 
the project in time. 
1.3 Problem Identification: 
The Local Government Engineering Department (LGED) is the premier development 
agency of the Government. One of major areas of Local Government Engineering 
Department (LGED)’s involvement in construction, repair & maintenance of rural roads 
and road structure, drainage & retaining structure, Primary school building, Local 
Government buildings. The expenditure involved in this sector amounts to around 2500 
crore taka yearly. It creates poses an enormous challenge to the procuring entity to ensure 
proper utilization of public money and ensure the expenditure of ADP money in time 
following PPR. 
In public sector of Bangladesh, implementation of the project in time or simply ensuring 
the proper utilization of funds for the benefit of public is a big challenge. It is therefore 
understood that the expenditure incurred by LGED in construction, repair & maintenance 
sector needs to be finalized in time, before the tendering process. Following up on these 
last two points, introducing negotiation in competitive tendering is widely recognized as 
an attractive procurement mechanism and is commonly advocated for several reasons. 
Most  notably  it  is  viewed  as  a  procedure  that  stimulates  and  promotes  
competition. By its nature, open competitive tendering invites potential suppliers from 
many venues. Furthermore, in  the  face  of  competition  from  many  potential  suppliers  
each  one  has strong  incentives  not  to  inflate  his  price. Indeed, fair market price 
discovery is often touted as a beneficial result of such tendering.  
Open competitive tendering mechanisms are also known for their transparency, making it 
easier to prevent corruption both in the public and private sectors  These  characteristics,  
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as well  as arguments for equal  opportunity,  provide  a  justification  for  statutes  such  
as  the  Public Procurement Rules 2008   that  strongly  favor  the  use  of  competitive  
tendering  in the public sector of Bangladesh.  
    Interestingly, there is widespread use of both competitive tendering and negotiations in 
the private sector separately.  For example, maximum private sector infrastructure in our 
country was procured using negotiations. In Bangladesh, from 2003 to 2011, +95% of 
private sector residential building construction for procurement in Dhaka were procured 
using negotiations, while only +5% were procured using open competitive tendering. The 
use of negotiations with single source suppliers is also common  in high tech  and  
software,  for  defense  procurement  as  well. Very recently, in energy sector introduce 
massive negotiation for production and supply electricity to make it as early as possible 
bypassing PPR. So that the procurement process need minimum time.  Considering 
above, we need to analyze whether negotiation could be used more often in public sector 
procurement. This research aims to do just that. 
This Chapter is a framework to compare competitive tendering with negotiations and 
relate these award mechanisms to the payment procedures chosen in the contract.  In 
particular, it tries to shed light on when competitive tendering with fixed price contracts 
will be preferred to negotiating cost plus contracts (engineering estimate). To put this 
Chapter in perspective it is worth observing that most of the economic analysis describes 
the procurement problem as follows. The  supplier  has  information about  production  
costs  that  the  procurer  does  not  have. The  procurer  then  has  to consider  clever  
ways  to  infer  the  suppliers  costs,    such  as  offering  the  supplier  many potential  
projects  to  choose  from,  and  having  the  supplier  select  the  one  that  will  be 
produced. 
In contrast, scholars and practitioners of engineering and construction management, argue 
that the central problem in procurement is not in implementation of the project. It lies on 
the tender processing, selection the right supplier, and offer cost plus contract amount. 
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Delay in decision making for contractor selection, re-tendering without considering the 
potentials of participated suppliers through negotiation hampering the project implement 
in time and within the estimated cost. 
An illustrative example of the significance of ex post adaptation is the building of the 
Getty Center Art Museum in Los Angeles, which is a 24 acre, $1 billion dollar facility 
that took over 8 years to construct (see Engineering New-Record 1994, 1997). The  
project design  had  to  be  changed  due  to  site  conditions  that  were  hard  to  
anticipate. The geology of the project included canyons,  slide  planes and  earthquake 
fault lines,  which posed  numerous  challenges  for  the  team  of  architects  and  
contractors.  For  instance, contractors  ―hit  a  slide‖  and  unexpectedly  moved  75,000  
cubic  yards  of  earth. More severely, in 1994 an earthquake struck.  Cracks in the steel 
welds of the building’s frame caused  the  contractors  to  reassess  the  adequacy  of  the  
seismic  design  standards  that were used.  The project design had to be altered also due 
to the regulatory environment 107 items had to be added to the building’s conditional use 
permit. These problems were very hard to predict, both for the procurer and the 
contractor.  However, it seems reasonable that once problems arose, the contractor had 
superior information regarding the costs and methods to implement changes.  A more 
recent and much more contentious example is the ―big dig‖ in Boston, where 12,000 
changes to more than 150 design and construction  contracts  have  led  to  $1.6  billion  
in  cost overruns,  much  of which  can  be traced back to unsatisfactory design and site 
conditions that differed from expectations. 
These observations suggest that the procurement problem may indeed be primarily one of 
smoothing out or circumventing adaptations after the project begins rather than 
information revelation by the supplier before the project is selected. In this Chapter we 
argue that the form of contracts and award mechanisms can be tailored in a way to help 
mitigate this procurement problem. In particular, a trade-off between incentives to reduce 
cost and incentives to facilitate changes and share information will be the key force in our 
 
 
15 
 
arguments of contractual choice. We argue that simple projects, which we define as easy 
to design with  little uncertainty about what needs to be produced, ought to be procured 
using fixed-price contracts, should  be  accompanied  by  high  levels  of  design  
completeness  (to  prevent  the  need  for adaptations), and are best awarded through 
competitive tendering.  In contrast, complex projects,  which  we  define  as  hard  to  
design  with  large  scope  for  surprises  in  the  final configuration,  ought  to  be  
procured  using  cost-plus  contracts,  should  be  accompanied by  low  levels  of  design  
completeness  (implying  a  high  chance  that  adaptations  to  the contract will be 
needed), and should be awarded through a negotiation with a reputable and qualified 
supplier. In an ongoing work if any change causes new item or cost overrun of any item 
more than 25% of the contract amount then we have to negotiate the unit rate for new 
item or excess of 25% of existing item. So that we can say that there is a minor presence 
of negotiation with supplier for ongoing project. This negotiating scope helps to continue 
the work smoothly. Similarly if we able to introduce negotiation in competitive bidding, 
it will help to minimize supplier selection time and help to implement the project in time. 
So that time & cost overrun of development project in our country achieved.  
The intuition for our prescriptions stems from a tension between providing incentives to  
lower  costs  and  avoiding  costly  and  wasteful  renegotiation  that  follows  requests  
for changes. The strong incentives to reduce costs that are offered by fixed-price tendered 
contracts  will  lead  the  parties  to  the  transaction  to  dissipate  valuable  surplus  when 
changes need to be renegotiated. This efficiency loss will often be due to haggling over 
prices when there is true lock-in of the current supplier who wishes to use the need for 
changes to his advantage.  Cost-plus contracts, in contrast, discourage cost-saving efforts 
but ease the process of renegotiating changes and adaptation to the contract’s original 
requirements. 
In tendering process front loaded offer from supplier is another problem creating 
situation. Many project stops on the half way due to poor forecasting of market price of 
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supplier. Negotiation with contractor about part payment system may help to overcome 
this problem. For example, we can decide in negotiation that part payment made 
according to engineer’s estimate. 
     We continue to argue that the choice of payment procedures, such as fixed price and 
cost plus contracts, is tied in with the follow-up decision that a procurer faces:  whether 
to  award  a  procurement  contract  by  competitive  tendering  with or without  
negotiating  with  a potential supplier.  
     While  our  research  has  been  motivated  by  practices  in  the  public  sector,  it  
offers implications  for  the  private sector  as  well. In Bangladesh the  public  sector  
statutes  that govern  procurement, typically  based  on  PPR’s,  strongly  favor  the  use  
of  competitive bidding. For example, from 2003 to 2011, more then 90% of public sector 
procurement using competitive bidding. Competitive bidding does have the advantage of 
unbiased awarding of projects, but it fails to respond optimally to ex post adaptation.  
This suggests that public procurement of complex projects are suffering from efficiency 
losses. This efficiency loss of competitive bidding may be avoided through introducing 
negotiation in competitive bidding. 
     We begin  our analysis in  the next section  with a simple framework to describe  the 
procurer’s  choice  of  devising  a  contract  that  will  govern  the  procurement  
relationship with  a  selected  supplier. We then continue to describe how the contracts 
chosen will dictate the use of award mechanisms.  We conclude with a discussion of 
implications for business strategy and public procurement. 
 Discussing with Project Director, Deputy Project Director, Project Manager and Senior 
Assistant Engineer I found that in Local Government Engineering Department (LGED), 
all construction, repair & maintenance work are conceived by the departmental officers 
by inspecting the current status of the location or infrastructure or by the requirement of 
the users. The initiation process starts through the preparation of engineer’s estimates, 
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gaining approval (both, fund – known as administrative approval and estimates – known 
as technical approval), preparation of specifications, floating of tenders, receiving and 
evaluating the tenders, approval of evaluation of tenders and contract with the successful 
bidder. These processes include minor sub processes along the way. Once the contract 
has been signed the implementation of the physical works begins which ultimately goes 
towards the completion of the works through the fulfillment of the obligations of all the 
concerned parties as stated in the contract. 
Moreover, in Bangladesh the Public Procurement Rules, 2008 And Public Procurement 
Act 2006 are in place providing strict procedures for tendering. Hence, the implication of 
these rules, regulations and acts need to be analyzed specially when there are specific 
time limits for every action regarding tendering. 
As it can be seen from the previous discussion that it is a lengthy process from the 
initiation to completion. The present study intends to examine the need additional 
involvement of senior officer for evaluation getting approval for additional cost over 
engineer’s estimate and waste of time for tender processing. The target is to minimize 
time in tender processing due to marginal variation of cost by introducing negotiation. we 
have to find out whether these time loss can be reduced both in terms of man hours and 
physical costs. 
1.4 Background of the Study: 
By evaluating the tendering process of Local Government Engineering Department 
(LGED) it was found that many times we have to re-tender to make suitable contract 
whose proposal match the existing government rule as well as financial target as well as 
target contract amount. As the tender document does not carry any estimated price due to 
restriction of the Public Procurement Act of Bangladesh bidders coated price may not 
match with estimated cost. When it less then engineer’s estimate then it is easy to take 
decision to finalize the contractor selection, but if the coated price exceed the engineer’s 
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estimate then the approval authority change and goes to hire level, so that it consume 
additional cost and time. If there any scope for tendering authority to recast the lowest 
coated price with a little variation normally reducing through negotiation with the bidders 
then the evaluation time as well as re-tendering time loss can be avoided. However, as far 
as I know no such studies have yet been carried out in Bangladesh especially in the public 
sector. 
Therefore, this study aims to provide an initial breakthrough in the area of time saving in 
the public sector tendering process by introducing negotiation in Bangladesh.   
1.5 Research Questions: 
In view of the discussion above the following research questions have been developed; 
The main research question for this study are  
a) What is the impact of negotiation in service procurement? 
b) What is the impact of negotiation in works and goods procurement? 
In study, looking at the impact of PPR on the Local Government Engineering Department 
(LGED)’s data with those of Public Works Department (PWD) and Roads and Highways 
Department (RHD), in the light of the size of the contract tendered will be done to find 
the possible areas of time reduction by introducing negotiations during the tendering 
process to examine the research question / hypothesis.  
The hypothesis of these research are developed as follows:  
Hypothesis-1: Negotiation reduces the time and cost of service procurement. 
Hypothesis-2: Negotiation will reduce the time and cost of works and goods 
procurement as well. 
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1.6 Methodology: 
This study intends to use detailed interview and discussions with field officers as 
the methods for collecting information. It is quite understandable that the officers 
involved in the preparation of estimates, floating tender and executing contract and 
contractor need to be interviewed. In this respect the major focus shall be on the 
office of the Upazila Engineer’s /executive engineers of the field or ex- field 
officer’s opinion. Also, reports from the monitoring, development and co-
ordination wings of the department as well as relevant officials of those offices 
need to be consulted. 
Consultation and discussing with procurer and supplier will emphasize on the time 
spent on the tendering to the execution of the contract and to determine whether 
more than necessary time is spent. These overrun of time may be in terms of man 
hour and/or other physical costs that may accrue as a result. 
After collection of the information, it will be compared against each other and a 
generalized quantitative summary will be derived to understand the possible time 
and cost saving that can be achieved during the pre-contract period. This will 
eventually help in find out whether the hypothesis of time and cost saving in public 
sector tendering process is valid or not.  
1.7 Limitations: 
Main limitations which are likely to be faced during this study will mainly be time 
constraint which in turn may not make the comparison of Local Government 
Engineering Department(LGED)’s data with those of Public Works Department 
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(PWD)and Roads and Highways Department (RHD) due to lack of logistic and 
financial support from department or institution. 
Some other limitation will be the fact that the study will concentrate on the tender 
processing time of development and maintenance works undertaken by LGED, 
hence development projects and their consequences on time reduction will not 
come into the picture during implementation phase. Moreover, it is to be 
understood that there can be a minor difference from one working division to 
another although it may not deviate from the main purpose of the study.  
  
1.8 Chapter Outline: 
The whole research work is presented in six different chapters. 
The first chapter is the introduction chapter; which gives an outline of the general 
background of the Local Government Engineering Department (LGED) and its 
nature of work. This chapter also explains the scope of research work, the 
identification of the problem, the research question, the objective of the work, the 
methodology to be followed with the probable limitations. 
The second chapter is the literature review chapter; which gives a generalized 
concept of the introducing negotiation model basing on which this research work 
intends to be carried out. This chapter also sets the analytical approaches needed to 
determine the time reduction in through negotiation in procuring goods and works. 
The third chapter is negotiation in competitive tendering chapter; where an 
elaboration benefit of negotiation in service procurement are evaluated and from 
that experience the complexity reduction of the works and goods procurement and 
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possible way & procedure identified including the selection of suitable supplier 
through negotiation. 
The fourth chapter is the discussion and Analysis chapter; which encompasses the 
introducing the negotiation in goods and works procurement. Considering the 
benefit of negotiation in service procurement, according the guideline of Public 
Procurement R regulation-2008 or PPA-2006, we can introduce it in goods and 
works procurement.  Find the way of possible time and cost reduction during the 
pre contract phase. This chapter also provides the results regarding time and cost 
savings in conformance with the general concept of the introducing negotiation and 
the different merit and demerit of negotiation in different situation of public 
procurement.  
The fifth chapter is the conclusion and summary chapter; which summarizes the 
findings and analysis to explain the quantifiable cost reduction in the process. This 
chapter also gives a guideline to the policy makers of the Local Government 
Engineering Department (LGED) in understanding the ways of time reduction 
during the pre contract phase. In addition to these this chapter also gives the 
limitations, assumptions and scope of further study in this field.  
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Chapter Two 
 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1  Theoretical overview of Negotiation 
Public procurement professionals have long had the reputation as knowledgeable 
bid evaluators. They can analyze the offer to determine responsiveness, conduct a 
technical evaluation of the bidder's capabilities, and even perform cost analysis 
when needed. However, more and more these same professionals are also being 
called upon for their negotiations skills. (Source- Bajari,  Patrick  and  Tadelis,  
Steven  (2001), Incentives Versus  Transaction  Costs: A Theory of  Procurement 
Contracts) 
As the profession sees an increased use of the request for proposal (RFP) process, 
there is a logical need for negotiation. A key phase of these types of procurements 
is negotiating the final agreement with the selected bidder. This negotiation often 
includes the specific terms and conditions of the contract, additional services or 
deliverables to be provided, as well as the final cost to the agency. 
Common areas for using a negotiated procurement process include construction, 
and architectural services, information technology projects, and software systems. 
Inherent to the RFP method is the government's ability to state their problem, 
invite solutions from an industry, and then negotiate with one or more of the top 
bidders. It is not unusual for a public agency to use negotiation in their final 
selection. In fact, many of the firms that submit a proposal are expecting just that. 
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In a non-competitive or sole source environment, negotiation is also the preferred 
approach. Even though the supplier has a strong position with their unique 
expertise or proprietary product, the government is still the one ―writing the 
check‖. In some situations, such as a formal bid invitation, negotiation may be 
prohibited by statute or regulation. This helps to protect the integrity of the 
procurement process. Even if the procurement does not involve negotiation as part 
of the selection process, it is still surrounded by opportunity. After all, aren't 
changes in the work schedule or product substitutions open for discussion? In 
many cases, the procurement professional can barter a deal between the contractor 
and the using department. Having strong negotiation skills will help ensure a win-
win outcome. 
Daily interactions with other business units are often a negotiation. Areas such as 
agency training, procurement system enhancements, and even administrative 
support are prime opportunities to sharpen one's negotiation skills. 
Traditionally, other business units have taken the lead in contractor negotiations, 
with the procurement professional brought in later to formalize the agreement. 
While being involved with the process is certainly a start, it is ideal when 
procurement can lead the negotiations. If public procurement professionals are 
serious about bringing their ―A game‖ to the table, they should realize the value of 
negotiation. Participating in professional training and in agency contract 
negotiations is invaluable.  
According to the Community and national legislation, "negotiated procedure 
means the procedure whereby the Contracting Authorities consult the economic 
operators of their choice and negotiate the terms of the contract with one or more 
of these."
 
in the negotiated procedure, "Contracting Authorities shall negotiate with 
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bidders the tenders submitted by them in order to adapt them to the requirements 
which they have set out in the contract notice, the tender documents and the 
additional documents, if any, and to seek out the best tender." In this procedure, the 
Contracting Authority should determine in the tender documents the individual 
negotiation steps and the terms to be the subject of negotiations. (Source- Bajari,  
Patrick  and  Tadelis,  Steven  (2001), Incentives Versus  Transaction  Costs: A 
Theory of  Procurement Contracts) 
Negotiation in the purchasing process covers the period from when the first 
communication is made between the purchasing buyer and the supplier through to 
the final signing of the contract. Negotiation can be as simple as trying to obtain a 
discount on a case of safety gloves through to the complexities of major capital 
purchases. A purchasing professional must aim to be successful in their 
negotiations with suppliers to obtain the best price with the best conditions for 
every item that is purchased. 
2.2 Negotiation in service procurement 
In PPR, for service procurement there is a stage of negotiation to finalized 
financial proposal where keeping the remuneration part intact, procurer and service 
provider negotiated with reaffixing the scope of work, logistic support. Other 
fringe benefit including government tax collection ret $ amount. It also negotiates 
the please posting, working condition number of field visit, transportation 
facilities, office accommodation etc.   So that if there is any ambiguity between 
procurer and supplier that would be removed and providing service goes 
accordingly.   
In The Public Procurement Rules 2008 has the following guidelines about 
negotiation. 
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Negotiations. |— (1) upon completion of the Evaluation of the Proposals, a PEC 
shall - 
(a) in the case of Quality and Cost Based Selection (QCBS) Method, review the 
combined Technical and Financial Evaluation Report and invite the Consultant that 
scored the highest in the combined Technical and Financial Evaluations for 
negotiations; 
(b) in the case of Fixed Budget Selection (FBS) Method, invite the Consultant that 
submitted the highest ranked Technical Proposal within the budget for 
negotiations; 
(c) in the case of the Least Cost Selection (LCS) Method, invite the Consultant that 
quoted the lowest price among those who passed the minimum technical points for 
negotiations. 
(2) The Procuring Entity shall notify the successful Consultant that its Proposal has 
been accepted and shall set a date for the commencement of Contract negotiations 
so that the Contract can come into force before the prescribed Proposal validity 
date expires. 
(3) A Proposal Evaluation Committee shall, in order to conclude a Contract, 
negotiate with the successful Consultant only on the following components of its 
Proposal: 
(a) Methodology; 
(b) Work plan and activity schedule; 
(c) Organization and staffing; 
(d) Deliverables; 
(e) Training inputs, if training is a major component; 
(f) Client or Procuring Entity's inputs; 
(g) Reimbursable, in the case of time-based Contracts; and 
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 (h) Proposed Contract price. 
(4) A PEC shall neither seek nor permit changes in the rates quoted for staff 
remuneration proposed by an Applicant in selection methods where the 
Applicant’s price is used as a factor in the evaluation. 
(5) The PEC may require the consultant to substitute a key staff, if it was found 
during 
Evaluation that he is not fit enough for the proposed assignment. 
(6) If an extension of validity of proposals was the reason that key staff were not 
available for a Firm, a change of key staff with equivalent or better qualification 
may be permitted. 
(7) During negotiations special attention shall be paid to defining clearly the inputs 
and facilities offered by the Procuring Entity. 
(8) Negotiations shall include discussions about the TOR but shall not significantly 
alter the original TOR so that the integrity of the negotiations and the content and 
findings of the technical Evaluation Report cannot be called into question. 
(9) Major reductions in work inputs shall not be made solely to meet the budget. 
(PPR 2008). 
2.3    The Contracting Framework 
Contractual Components-Design and Incentives. In this section we discuss and 
analyze the precursor to awarding a contract:  devising one. Consider a procurer 
who wishes to procure a project (good or works) from a supplier. To  facilitate  the  
procurement  and  get  what  he  desires,  the  procurer  must  provide  the supplier 
with  plans and  specifications that  describe the project and kept an engineer’s 
estimate. This is the procurer’s first dimension of contractual choice:  how much 
design costs to invest at the onset, where more  investment  (and  costs)  in  design  
 
 
27 
 
creates  a  more  detailed  set  of  plans, specifications and more market based 
engineer’s estimate. Clearly, a more detailed and accurate design of a project 
reduces the possibility of negotiating changes after the project starts taking shape.  
It  is  often  prohibitively  expensive  to  draft  a  complete  design  that  includes  
all  the relevant  blueprints  and $ engineer’s estimate or Bill Of Quantities(BOQ) 
instructions  that  fully  describe  the  project  exactly  as  the  procurer’s  needs  
dictate. That  is,  there  is  always  a  chance  that  a  contingency  will  arise for 
which their are no engineer’s estimate are insufficient. This in turn implies that the 
plan as specified may not result in the successful completion of the procurement 
process,  and  the  procurer  may  not obtain  the  value  he  initially  expected. We  
refer  to this  problem  as poor engineer’s estimate  because  it  is  generally  
associated  with  the market price not being match with bidding price. So that 
procurer have to negotiate with supplier to minimize the gap between engineer’s 
estimate and offered price which will save time from re-tendering.  
The  poor engineer’s estimate  of  the  project  will  depend  not  only  on  how  
much investment in engineer’s estimate was initially performed, but will also 
depend on how prone the market price of  construction methods project is to 
unforeseen changes.  Such unforeseen changes can arise from un availability or 
currencies fluctuation for imported goods that are just to hard to predict or plan for, 
or alternatively too  expensive  to  try  and  draft  onto  the engineer’s estimate.      
To  overcome this, problem considering the complexity of  the  project  as  how  
expensive  it  is  to  provide negotiation with lowest bidders rather then market 
based engineer’s estimate preparation. The more complex a project is the more 
expensive it will be to try and prevent market based engineer’s estimate. Thus, the 
procurer’s first choice is how complete a market based engineer’s estimate to 
invest in while being aware of the costs of variable components that can affect the 
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project’s bidding activities. Most procurement contracts are variants of simple 
fixed-price or cost-plus contracts.  In fixed price contracts (up to 20 million Taka), 
the procurer offers the supplier a pre-specified price for  completing  the  project  
as  specified, and any changes in % are coated in the tender documents. Normally 
offered price are below or equal to engineer’s estimate and no negotiation is 
required. A variable (more than 20 million Taka) contract does not specify a price, 
but compare the bidding price with engineer’s estimate. If offered price less then 
engineer’s estimate, contract formed without any question, but if the offered price 
exceed the engineer’s estimate then it needs approval from heir authority. 
Sometimes the decision goes in favor of re-tendering, but both are time consuming. 
2.4     The costs and benefits of Negotiation  
We are now in a position to highlight some tradeoffs of using either payment 
structure. Let us  start  by  ignoring  first  any  changes  to  the  original  engineer’s 
estimate,  and  assume  that  the project  will  be  executed  exactly  within 
engineer’s estimate. If a fixed-price contract is in place then the supplier bears all 
of the costs of providing the project. This, of course, implies that the supplier has 
strong negotiation to lower the cost of production, and some of these would pass 
on to the procurer through negotiation (that we discuss more in the next section). In 
contrast, if a market based contract where estimated cost are unknown to supplier, 
it is not easy to predict the actual cost by following design and specification. So 
that in this situation then the supplier knows that any extra costs he incurs will be 
fully compensated for, and may even generate a small profit if the fee is based on a 
percentage of the costs. If the coated price exceeded the estimated price which is 
matched the market price then the supplier will have to negotiate to reduce the 
costs of production, and such costs savings can therefore be transferred to the 
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procurer. To set a benchmark imagines an idealized situation where the engineer’s 
estimate of the project leaves no room for market based variations. For example, 
imagine that all the engineer’s estimate of the project are completely clear and well 
documented, and match with market price which is easy to verify upon delivery.  
For this idealized case the observations discussed earlier lead to an obvious 
conclusion: 
Situation  1: If engineer’s estimate is clear and match with market price and 
if it is less then 20m taka then favor fixed-price contracts.  
     This simple observation is a direct consequence of the fixed price provided by 
each of the two payment structures. In PPR there is a provision for the project cost 
are below or equal to twenty million having clear specification, the official 
estimate is fixed and the supplier will only coat the percent less or above. 
Dimension of interest to the procurer is the cost, then clearly one wants to achieve 
the lowest possible cost, and this is achieved by providing the supplier with the 
strongest possible incentives to lower costs. Notice, however, that two 
qualifications were stated in practical. The first qualification is that engineer’s 
estimate is clear due to project cost are below or equal to twenty million having 
clear specification. This means that the procurer  can  avoid  the  need  to  ask  for  
any  changes  or  modifications  after  the  project commences,  and  no redrafting  
or  renegotiating  will  be needed  to  complete  the  project according to the 
procurer’s needs.  The second qualification is that project cost is above twenty 
million having clear specification/ not. This means that the procurer can easily 
detect any departures from the design and specification as well as any shortfalls 
like budget shortage especially in case of LGED that deviate from the specified 
requirements. Furthermore, the fact that performance can be verified means that 
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any such deviations from the design and specifications can  be  used as  negotiate 
with the supplier. This guarantees that if the supplier wishes to receive payment, he 
must satisfy all the requirements that meet the procurer’s needs according to 
negotiated terms and condition of the job. 
Situation  2: If it is impossible or extremely costly to contractually verify 
important performance measures, and if the contractor can save on costs 
by cutting back on these performance dimensions, then favor 
negotiation.  
Practical Conclusion 2 resonates with the old saying of ―you get what you pay for‖. 
If the supplier is bound to a fixed price contract he will, as mentioned earlier, have 
strong incentives to cut on costs. When  cutting  corners  is  one  way  to  achieve  
costs  savings, then it better be easy to deter such behavior if the procurer is 
harmed by it.  This simple observation is often recognized by practitioners, but 
when ignored, can lead to extremely undesirable outcomes. Thus, negotiation 
contracts have merits by inhibiting a supplier’s incentives to cut costs by cutting 
back on important, yet hard to monitor performance dimensions. It turns out that 
negotiation contracts have another appealing feature, which has been recognized at 
least by some scholars and practitioners in the area of construction management:  
facilitating changes and modifications to the original designs and specifications. In 
another word if there any scope of negotiation with bidders, it will help to 
minimize time loss so that the project will complete in time. 
For example, the most common sources of changes in building construction are 
defective plans and specifications, changes in project scope and differing 
conditions than expected at the site of construction.  In other words, any change 
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will often lead to the need for renegotiating the original specifications of the 
project as well as implementation cost and time. 
Conventional wisdom in the industry is that negotiated contracts are better suited 
to facilitate  such  change  and  to  reduce  the  amount  of  adversarial  relations  
and  frictions between  the  procurer  and  the  supplier  when  such  changes  are  
required. To  see  why, imagine a situation where at some advanced stage of the 
project’s development it turned out  that  the  plans  and  specifications  are  
defective, or  lacking  some  directive  for  an unforeseen issue that arises.  
Consider the effects of having a fixed price contract in place when the procurer 
asks the supplier to adopt some changes to the original plan.  The original plans 
and fixed price compensation  take  the  form of a  specific-performance  contract 
that binds the  supplier to the original  plans and  does not oblige him to agree to 
the  changes proposed  by the procurer.  Thus, the procurer will have to negotiate 
any changes with the supplier.  The procurer’s objective is to get the changes done 
in the most cost effective way according to his needs while the supplier wishes to 
make as high a profit as he can from the potential windfall.   The  supplier  would  
like  to  take  advantage  of  this  situation  since  he  is  in  a unique position of 
being able to hold up the procurer as a consequence of being in the midst of the 
project, and has no competitive pressure to discipline his behavior.  Knowing this, 
the procurer may expect to be overcharged and the two parties are likely to engage 
in contentious adversarial negotiations. Alternatively,  consider  the  effects  of 
having  a negotiating scope for cost  plus  contract  in  place  when  the procurer 
asks the supplier to adopt some changes to the original plan.  Unlike the specific- 
performance nature of a fixed price contract, a cost plus contract effectively has a 
built in  mechanism  to  compensate  the  supplier  for  any  changes  that  are  
required. Namely, any additional costs that the supplier incurs are automatically 
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compensated for through the cost-plus structure. In other words, the presence of 
negotiation for cost adjusting serves as a lubricant for minimize the contractual 
time and implementing cost of the project and cooperative implementation of 
changes when contractual incompleteness gives rise to the need for changes. 
Situation  3: If engineer’s estimate and bidders price very marginally and 
the need for flexibility to implement changes is important for contractor 
selection through negotiation within limited budget. 
We can now conclude this section with a recommendation that follows from the 
trade-offs between reducing the offered price within engineer’s estimate or re-
tender, by negotiation with lowest bidder.   Recall  that  a project  is  said  to  
be  complex  if  the  procurer  anticipates  it  to  be  difficult  to  describe, specify  
and  monitor,  so  that  a  rather  complete  design  will  be  exceptionally  costly  to 
provide (or maybe even impossible) so that the tender documents are not clear to 
the supplier, then it is better to select contractor and finalize contract price through 
negotiation . In contrast, a project is simple if it is easy and rather inexpensive to 
design and it is straightforward to predict and monitor performance.  Since the 
costs of design and engineering efforts are an integral part of the total project costs 
we can conclude our recommendations as follows: 
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Situation 4: For simple projects favor a complete investment in design 
and specification followed by a fixed-price contract, while for complex 
projects favor a low investment in design followed by negotiated 
contract.  
It is worth explaining the reason for favoring savings on design for complex 
projects. At  first  it  may  seem  that  complex  projects  would  require  an  extra  
effort  in  trying  to provide more details into the design. However,  the complexity 
of such projects implies that  many  changes  are  expected  even  if  design  efforts  
are  high. Thus, if a cost-plus contract is in place and negotiation is a part of 
contract agreement to deal with such changes, the added benefits of extra design 
efforts are small. This  follows  because  it  will  not  be  too  costly  to  implement  
changes  in  the aftermath of unforeseen issues, which makes the benefits of a more 
complete design less pronounced. A  caveat  is  that  one  would  wish  to  avoid  
changes  that  will  completely disrupt the projects production plan and cause 
expensive changes to the infrastructure as  it  develops.  Thus,  some  initial  
investment  in  planning  will  be  necessary  to  predict how complete  the  design  
ought  to be  to  at least set  the  stage  for proceeding  with  the project as well as 
making effective negotiation with supplier for time and money saving. 
 Now that we have set up the contractual framework and offered some insights 
about the  trade-offs  facing  our  procurer  in  designing  the  contract’s  structure,  
we  proceed  to explore the connection between the contract’s structure and the 
award mechanisms that the procurer can choose.(Source-Incentives and Award 
Procedures: Competitive Tendering vs. Negotiations in Procurement) 
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CHAPTER-3 
3.1 Negotiations in Competitive Tendering. 
In post tender negotiation provided it is undertaken professionally and ethically, 
we believe that post tender negotiation is an appropriate process to secure value for 
money. It is the responsibility of the purchasing and supply management 
professional to determine whether, for any particular contract, post tender 
negotiation should be undertaken. We suggests that bid clarification i.e. detailed 
discussion about the offer, should usually comprise the final stage after receipt of 
tenders and before contract award; it will normally lead to improved value being 
obtained. This is because there are often points in the tender which need to be 
clarified. It may also be necessary to undertake bid clarification with several 
suppliers, for example if a bid appears especially low, or especially high on price. 
During bid clarification, discussion might take place around the specification or 
delivery period for example. This may lead to negotiation on terms and conditions, 
warranties, payment terms or price. It is important however, that during this 
process of negotiation, the changed offer does not alter the competition. Where the 
negotiation is taking place with the clear winner, as judged against the preset 
selection criteria, it would not matter if the outcome dramatically changed. The 
problem arises where for instance, three suppliers are undergoing a process of bid 
clarification and negotiation and the third most attractive offer suddenly changes 
substantially. It is important in this case to allow all suppliers access to the same 
information and the same opportunity to review their proposals. Expert of 
procurements believes that during post tender negotiation on price, suppliers must 
be treated fairly and courteously. The person responsible for negotiating should be 
the purchasing and supply management professional, but where this is not the case, 
 
 
35 
 
it is their responsibility to ensure that the negotiator conducts the negotiation on a 
professional basis. Post tender negotiation is a key skill of the purchasing and 
supply management professional and, like other aspects of negotiation, the expert 
of procurements believes that the purchasing and supply management professional 
should undertake a refresher training course, once every five years. (Source- 
Bajari,  Patrick  and  Tadelis, Incentives and Award Procedures: Competitive 
Tendering vs. Negotiations in Procurement) 
 
We  proceed  to  argue  that  the  choice  of  a  contract’s  payment structure  
should  be  tied to the choice of award mechanism, namely, the choice between a 
process of competitive tendering and a negotiation with a selected supplier.           
To set the stage, recall the many known benefits of competitive tendering.  First, it 
promotes competition among potential suppliers.   Second,  it  offers  a  kind  of  
transparency  that  helps  mitigate  favoritism  and corruption. The question is then, 
what is the object over which bids are solicited and what form should these bids 
take?  Consider  our  contractual  framework  and  imagine  that  a  simple  project  
is  at  stake where  our  procurer  follows  Situation-4  and  chooses  to  invest  in  a  
rather complete  design  that  is  accompanied  by  a  fixed-price contract. This  
implies  that  our procurer  is in  a position  to give  a very  detailed  description  of 
the  project to potential suppliers,  and  all  the  procurer  wishes  to  receive  in  
return  is  a  single  price  that  will be  paid  once  the  project  is  completed  
according  to  the  plans  and  specifications. In this situation a competitive 
tendering mechanism will offer the procurer all its benefits. Suppliers  will  have  
to  compete  their surplus  away,  and  the  procurer is  getting  exactly what he 
wants:  a well defined project at the lowest possible price.  If the procurer instead 
chooses to negotiate a price with a single supplier, the competitive pressure is 
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weak and the  procurer  will  not achieve  all  the  possible  cost-savings  that  he  
can. Therefore we conclude:  
Situation  5: For simple well specified projects favor a fixed-price 
contract to be awarded by a competitive tender.  
Now turn to the other case of a complex project with an incomplete design and 
which the procurer plans to award using a cost-plus  contract where cost means 
engineer’s estimate and plus means additional claim by the supplier over 
engineer’s estimate. As  most  practitioners  would readily  agree,  ―[a]  cost-
plus contract does  not lend  itself well  to  competitive  bidding,‖ and  in  the  area  
of  construction  management,  ―most  negotiated  contracts  are  of  the cost-plus-
fee type.‖ To try and implement a competitive tender for a cost-plus contract   after 
open bidding the cost of the project will determine from the coated price of the 
contractors, and then one might suggest that bidders then provide their bids over 
the ―plus‖ portion of the compensation.  In this way the procurer can choose the 
supplier who requests the lowest compensation for his management, if necessary to 
reduce the plus portion, procurer can negotiate with suppliers and  the  production  
costs of labor and  material  will  be  automatically  paid  for through the  cost-plus  
structure. However,  as  the  ―plus‖  is  often  only  a  small  fraction  of  the costs,  
any change of the design or work volume can be readjust by cost-plus  structure so 
that negotiation can be suitable way to select a contractor for what is in essence a 
challenging and complex project and time can be saved by avoiding heir level 
approval, re-tendering process or both. (Source- Bajari, Patrick  and  Tadelis, 
Incentives and Award Procedures: Competitive Tendering vs. Negotiations in 
Procurement) 
 
 
37 
 
 
To  see  this  we  begin  by  considering  what  will  determine  a  supplier’s  
desired  compensation  when  bidding  for  a  contract. Clearly,  a  supplier  will  
not  wish  to  settle  for less than  he could obtain  in  some  alternative job. If,  as 
one would  imagine,  more cost efficient and able suppliers have better alternative 
opportunities, then their bid for a fee in  a  cost-plus  contract  will  be  higher  than  
less able and  cost efficient  suppliers. This argument  implies  that  is  the  highest  
cost  and  least  able  supplier  who  will  win  such  a competitive tender for a cost-
plus fee. Furthermore, if complex projects that are tied to cost plus contracts 
require suppliers that have more expertise, then hiring the least able supplier can be 
devastating. Instead of using a competitive tender the procurer can search the 
market for those able and reputable suppliers and choose one to negotiate with in 
order to set the fee for the cost-plus contract. So that it will provide extra benefit of 
the competitive bidding advantage to the procurement entity.  In this way the 
procurer guarantees himself a qualified and able supplier with minimum time and 
cost.  Furthermore, since the fee is expected to be a small fraction of the costs, the 
lack  of  competitive  pressure  on  the  supplier  will  not have  a  large  effect  on  
final  costs. (Source- Bajari,  Patrick  and  Tadelis, Incentives and Award 
Procedures: Competitive Tendering vs. Negotiations in Procurement) 
Situation 6:   For complex and incompletely specified projects favor a 
competitive bidding – plus negotiation contract to be awarded using a 
negotiation with a suitable supplier. 
    We  have  described  a link  between the choice  of contractual  payment 
structure  and the  way  in  which  such  contracts  ought      to  be  awarded. As  it  
turns  out,  there  is  a complementary  reason  to  favor  negotiations  with  a  
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suitable supplier  over  tendering when complex projects are to be awarded.  
Practitioners have recognized that competitive tendering stifles valuable 
coordination between the procurer and the potential supplier before the plans and 
specifications are finalized. To  see  this  note  that  the  primary information  that  
the  procurer  receives  from  suppliers  in  a  competitive  tender  is  their bid. A  
supplier  has  no  incentive  to  offer  the  procurer  advice  on  how  to  improve  
the plans or avoid certain pitfalls. In fact, a supplier would have the incentive to 
keep any findings of this kind to himself as they offer him a competitive advantage 
over his rivals in a competitive tendering process. For example, it is widely 
believed in the construction industry that when competitive tendering is used to 
award a fixed-price contract, the contractors strategically read the plans and 
specifications to determine where they will fail.  Suppose that some contractor sees 
a flaw in the plans that will cause a change leading to 10 million taka of profits, 
and  that  the  other  contractors  do  not. Our  savvy  contractor  will  likely  win  
the  job since  he  would  be  willing to  bid  less than  contractors who do  not  see  
the  flaws  in  the plans.  Competitive tendering may therefore leads to a problem 
of ex-ante opportunism that is more problematic when projects are complex. After 
he is awarded the project, the pitfalls he anticipated will materialize and he will be 
in a position to reap excessive profits from the required changes. In  negotiations,  
however,  the  procurer  and  supplier  typically  spend  a  good  deal  of time 
discussing the project before contract formed between procurer and supplier. 
During such negotiations the procurer can elicit the supplier’s views about where 
the designs and specifications can be improved, so that negotiations might be 
preferable to competitive tendering. The  construction industry  literature  suggests  
that  one  merit  of  cost  plus  contracting  and  negotiation  is that procurers and 
contractors spend more time discussing the project and ironing out possible pitfalls 
before work begins.  Thus, we conclude: 
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Situation  7: In a complex projects for which the expertise and input of 
an experienced  supplier  is  essential  at  the  design  stage,  favor  a  
cost-plus  contract  to be awarded using a negotiation with a short listed 
suitable supplier.  
We conclude this section with some insights and recommendations for projects that 
are not clearly categorized as very simple or complex, and for which the choice of 
contract structure and award procedure is not obvious. Consider the effects of 
market conditions on the choice of contracts and award procedures. It is well  
known  that the benefits  from  a  competitive  tender  will  generally  depend  on  
the  number  of  qualified bidders who will participate.  In particular, the more 
potential suppliers are available for bidding, the higher the benefits from 
promoting competition.  We have: 
Situation  8: In a moderately complex projects where specification at 
moderate costs, if there is more potential competition then favor a more 
complete design and a fixed price contract to be awarded using a 
competitive tender.  If potential suppliers are scarce then save on design 
costs and favor a cost-plus negotiated contract with a qualified supplier.  
Finally, we consider the difference between an open competitive tender in which 
any supplier can submit a bid to the procedure of ―invited bidders‖ in which only a 
handful of suppliers are invited to participate in the competitive tender. To analyze 
potential differences between these procedures consider the response of suppliers 
to a request for bids for a rather complex, but somewhat well specified project. 
Preparing the bid will be more challenging and costly the more complex and large 
the project is. If qualified suppliers expect that less qualified suppliers may try to 
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compete and offer low bids, then they also may try to compete and offer low bids, 
so that qualified suppliers will be available for contract no negotiation is essential.  
Hence, a procurer may not be able to attract qualified suppliers if price competition 
is expected to be fierce.  If the procurer can prevent less qualified suppliers from 
bidding and in this way restrict competition to guarantee a reasonable rate of return 
then the qualified suppliers will have incentives to invest in preparing these bids 
and compete. In this situation the offered price may far from expectation as well as 
actual cost, where negotiation is very important. It will help to establish cost plus 
contract. Thus, for  moderately  complex  projects  for  which  several  qualified 
bidders  exist,  and  for  which  preparing  bids  includes  significant  costs  on  the  
suppliers,  favor  a  fixed  price  contract  to  be  awarded  by  inviting  a  small  
number  of qualified suppliers to a competitive tender. Contract can be finalized 
through negotiation to save the procurement time and cost of contract. (Source- 
Bajari,  Patrick  and  Tadelis, Incentives and Award Procedures: Competitive 
Tendering vs. Negotiations in Procurement) 
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CHAPTER-4 
4.1 Lessons for Business Strategy  
The widespread benefits offered by competitive tendering to set a project’s price 
are well known:   promoting competition and hampering corruption. We have shed 
some light, however, on some of the costs of using this popular mechanism.  In 
fact, in a recent study of contracts awarded in the construction industry in Northern 
California it was found that in the private sector there is widespread use of 
negotiations.  Specifically, more than 43%  of  over 4,000 private sector contracts  
between 1995  and 2000 were  awarded using negotiations with a sole supplier, 
while only 18% were awarded using open competitive tendering  (most of the  rest 
were awarded  using  a select group  of  invited  bidders which is also a part of 
negotiation). An analysis of the data suggests that the choices made are consistent 
with the trade-offs we have laid out in our analysis above. As we have argued, 
there are two channels through which cost-plus negotiation contracts where cost 
base may be change during negotiation and the contract awarded through 
negotiation can be more attractive than fixed-price contracts awarded through 
competitive tendering. The first is the need for flexibility and changes to 
incompletely specified designs of complex projects.  A response to this problem is 
choosing a cost-plus contract that cannot be competitively tendered in a sensible 
way. The second channel, which has been emphasized by some industry 
participants, is using the knowledge and experience of a contractor before the 
designs are complete and construction begins. As we have argued, if a project will 
be awarded using competitive bidding then a contractor has an incentive to hide 
information about possible design flaws, submit a low bid, and recoup profits when 
changes will be required.  
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Again we can consider the problem below, where the procurement problem we 
investigate is generally applicable, be that of an auto- mobile  manufacturer  who  
needs  to procure  a  braking system,  an  accounting  firm  who needs  to  procure  
information  technology  services,  or  a  city  government  that  needs  to provide  
garbage  collection  and  disposal  services  for  its  residents.  This  problem  is  
also related  to  the ―make-or-buy‖  problem  of  the  organization  of  production,  
which  is  the choice  of  which  activities  to  produce  oneself,   and  which  to  
outsource to  an  external supplier.   If  we  consider the  procurement  of goods  
and  services  that  are  repeated  over time, then we can view internal organization 
and self production as buying the time of employees and paying directly for the 
input materials, much like a sequence of cost-plus contracts (where the fee is 
comparatively high, so that fund are not spent but absorbed as part of the 
organization’s profits). Alternatively outsourcing transactions for a predetermined 
price that depends on output performance. 
Our analysis suggests that for long term and steady provision, goods and works 
that are simple in our contractual framework should be outsourced with fixed-price 
contracts. As supplier for such product is available, hard negotiation is very 
effective. While goods and works that are complex and plus is comparatively 
higher margin, should be internally produced as if they are procured with a cost-
plus contract. It will create pressure over supplier to reduce there profit margin 
during negotiation and procurer will be benefited due to position in upper hand. 
The  benefits  of  internal  production  are  also  that the  procurer  retains  control  
over  the  process,  which  may  indeed  be  a  valuable  option when  complex  
issues  are  at  hand  and  direction  and  flexibility  are needed  throughout the  
process  of  production.     Casual  observation  suggests  that  in  many  cases  
employees have  directives  that  specify  their  work,      but  these  are  often  
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verbal  and  not  specified in  a  detailed  contract.   Outside contractors are subject 
to very detailed contracts and contractual compliance is measured vis-a-vis these 
formal specifications. But prepare a detail specification is not always easy. It takes 
a lot of time and cost. But by introducing negotiation we can able to readjust the 
terms and condition as well as bidding amount which is beyond the limit of 
inviting authority.  
4.2    Lessons for Public Sector Policy  
In the public sector, statutes such as the PPR strongly favor the use of competitive 
bidding, and particularly open competitive bidding when feasible. For instance, in 
our study of the construction industry in public sector like LGED, RHD, PWD etc 
mentioned above that 98% of the projects awarded in the public sector were 
awarded using open competitive bidding as compared to very few in the private 
sector.  As private sector firms are more sensitive to cost and time minimization, it 
is reasonable to conclude that their behavior is more responsive to optimal choices.  
As mentioned above, competitive bidding is perceived to select the lowest cost 
bidder, prevent  corruption  and  favoritism  that  are  opposed  to  efficiency,  and  
it  offers  a  clear yardstick with which to compare offers.  According to an Ohio 
Court, competitive bidding ―...gives everyone an equal chance to bid,       
eliminates  collusion,    and  saves  taxpayers’ money...  It fosters honest 
competition in order to obtain the best work and supplies at the lowest possible 
price because taxpayers’ money is being used.  It is also necessary to guard against 
favoritism, impudence, extravagance, fraud and corruption.‖ This is the main 
rational for requiring competitive tendering in the public sector.  
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Our results suggest that for complex projects, there is a downside to the use of 
fixed- price contracts awarded through competitive tendering and that selecting a 
contractor and negotiating with him may be the favorable course of action.  This 
downside of open competitive  bidding  can  arise  from  a  lack  of  input  by  
contractors  at  the  design  stage, from  the  need  to  proceed  quickly  without  the  
ability  to  complete  detailed  plans  and specifications, and from the expectations 
that ex post haggling and frictions might occur when  changes  are  needed. An  
important  practical  question  for  public  procurement  is whether  one  can  
design  a set  of  objective  rules  for  awarding  negotiated  contracts  that 
minimize transaction costs, but that are not easily subject to manipulation, 
corruption, or blatant favoritism. 
The  design  of  novel  rules  that  on  one  hand  allow  the  use  of flexible-cost 
plus negotiation contracts while on the other hand offer some controls that reduce 
the possible scope of opportunistic behavior is beyond the scope of this article. 
That said, our  analysis  suggests  that  there  may  be  large  gains  and  savings  of  
tax-payers’  money from designing and successfully implementing cost-plus 
negotiations in the public sector with better controls. Considering all, it is clear 
combined effect of competitive bidding and cost plus negotiation will improve the 
quality of spending of public money. It will help to implement the development 
project in time with minimum cost as well as ensuring the quality of works. 
4.3 Discussions and Analysis 
When engineer’s estimate is clear, match with market price and less then 20m taka 
then in LGED follow Limited Tendering Method (LTM). In LTM bidders can offer 
bid price + 5% of engineer’s estimate which belongs to fixed-price contract. But if 
the Job is complicated and engineer’s estimate not match with market price then 
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they follow the Open Tendering Method (OTM). But in this situation OTM only 
apply for re-tendering. If there any scope of negotiation in PPR then  LGED can 
negotiate with bidder about complexity and market price of the works. So that +5% 
bar for coated price followed by re-tendering need not required. As a result bidding 
process will required shorter time period. 
 
Some times LGED implement some odd job which are not regular and impossible 
or extremely costly to contractually verify important performance measures. Due 
dissimilarity with the regular job, in this situation LGED look for a capable, 
experience contractor who is fit for work. So that the contractor can save on costs 
by cutting back on these performance dimensions, then favor negotiation. At 
present they go through normal process causing criticality in implementation and 
time consume a lots. 
If engineer’s estimate and bidders price very marginally and the need for flexibility 
to implement changes is important for contractor selection through negotiation 
within limited budget. But at present LGED normally go for re-tender or reduce 
the scope the work. 
It is suitable for simple projects that favor a complete investment in design and 
specification followed by a fixed-price contract, while for complex and 
incompletely specified projects favor a low investment in design followed by 
negotiated contract. Due to absent of negotiation in bidding process at present 
LGED go for a complete investment in design and specification followed by a 
fixed-price or bidder’s price contract for both simple and complex works. So that 
the total cost of the works goes up. 
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In  a complex projects for which the expertise and input of an experienced  supplier  
is  essential  at  the  design  stage,  favor  a  cost-plus  contract  to be awarded using 
a negotiation with a short listed suitable supplier. But at present LGED do the job 
through multiple stages. For example, in case of Moghbazar-Mouchak flyover, 
traffic pattern and their movement study, detail design and engineering estimate 
prepared separately by a service contract. Now they made some contract with 
service provider and implementing agency to execute the works. So that it will take 
a handsome amount of time to complete the job. If there any scope of negotiation 
in PPR exist then LGED may choose the a cost-plus  contract  to be awarded using 
a negotiation with a short listed suitable supplier for such complex projects. 
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CHAPTER-5 
 
 
 
5.1 Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
Conclusion 
Tendering and post tender negotiation are fundamental purchasing and supply 
management skills which must be executed professionally and ethically in order to 
obtain best value for money. This document has described the principles and 
processes of good practice in respect of the above but does not intend to be 
prescriptive. In particular, purchasing and supply management professionals in the 
utilities and public sectors must ensure compliance with the public procurement 
rules. Expert personnel suggest and recommends that purchasing and supply 
management professionals adopt the principles of good practice but define and 
develop their own signature purchasing processes which are best suited to their 
own organizations and reflect the sectors, industries and markets in which their 
organizations are positioned. 
Invitation of tender and supplier selection is an important component of 
procurement. In implementation a project in time & budget is a great challenge. At 
the same time the selection of a qualified supplier is anther challenge. In LGED we 
found that the selection of a service provider takes marginal time if there 
responsive service provider are available. Because, if there any deviation about 
service hour (man month) of coated price that can be modified keeping the unit 
price unchanged. This is only possible due to presence of negotiation between 
service provider and the procure entity. Getting the responsive offers it is rear case 
of re-invitation for proposal only for financial offer deviates from the estimates. In 
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an ongoing project due to unavoidable circumstance or betterment of the work we 
have to change our design as well as bill of quantities. To implement the non 
tendered item and non tendered item more then engineer’s estimate we go through 
negotiation with supplier. This is because, separating the work from original 
quantity is some times not possible, critical, not justified and time & cost 
consuming.  
Recommendations 
From the above discussion it is clear that negotiations are present in our 
procurement rules. It plays a vital role in both service procurements and work 
procurement when the works are ongoing stage. Considering all we can say proper 
introduction of negotiation process in procurement will also improve our works 
and goods procurement like service procurement. It will help to implement the 
project within stipulated time and thus reduce total cost. It will reduce the haggle 
of re-tendering or getting the approval from higher authority. Executives are able 
to implement the project smoothly. For example in LGED, like others Procuring 
Entity (PE), district /upazila executives are able to finalize the contract within the 
estimated cost. But if the coated price exceed estimated cost, up to 15% he/she 
need to get approval from Head Of Procuring Entity (HOPE) means departmental 
head and for more then 15% above approval comes from ministry. Again re-
tendering process also more critical, because only HOPE have the capacity to 
given approval for re-tendering, what ever the situation. Higher level approval and 
re-tendering both are time consuming process. It reduces the working time; expand 
the project duration and cost overrun. If government introduce negotiation in 
works and goods procurement, in many cases re-tendering and higher level 
approval can be avoided. For example, in a tendering process of LGED or any 
other department lowest responsive bidders coated price may 0.12% above 
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estimated price as the estimated price disclosed after tender receiving. According 
to PPR it needs the approval from HOPE which is time consuming. If there any 
scope of negotiation in PPR between PE and lowest competitive and responsive 
bidder then the bidder may accept the PE’s offer to do the job at estimated price. 
Because time loss for approval from HOPE may cause cost escalation of 
construction material from which he/she may suffer more loss. Now tender/ re-
tender process takes more or less 90days for bidder selection. A minor change in 
bidder capacity may create the lowest bidders bids as technically responsive. In 
this situation negotiation may play a vital role to identify a prospective bidder as 
well as reduce the probability of re-tendering. As negotiation is a both way 
communication it also helpful for quality works. Again negotiation in 
procurements between bidders and procurer creates good relation and 
understanding. Every party is able to understand the expectation of other parties 
and act accordingly. So that they are satisfied up to highest level as their 
expectation fulfilled. It is the ultimate target of project implementation. 
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Bibliographical Notes  
The analysis provided above is based primarily on information from central 
procurement technical unit (CPTU), Bangladesh, The Public Procurement 
Regulations 2003, The Public Procurement Act’ 2006, Public Procurement Rules-
2008, Bangladesh Forms 2908, Bangladesh Forms 2911, Bajari and Tadelis (2001) 
and Bajari, McMillan  and  Tadelis  (2006). The implications  of  how  complexity  
of  a  process  may affect the choice to outsource or self-produce is analyzed in 
Levin and Tadelis (2006) who apply their framework to procurement by local 
governments.  An attempt to measure the transactions cost impact of changes  to  
contracts in works  procurement was done  by Bajari, Houghton and Tadelis 
(2006).  Related to this agenda is a paper by McLeod and Chakravarty  (2004)  
who show  that  current contracts use  by the  American Institute of Architects is 
helpful for the problem of procuring large, complex projects when unforeseen 
contingencies  are  inevitable. Corts  and  Singh  (2004)  show  the  relationship  
between contractual choice and project complexity in the face of repeat business.  
(Banerjee and Duflo (2000) offer some evidence that correlates the choice of cost-
plus contracting with reputable suppliers in the Indian software industry. A 
classical analysis of competitive tendering having negotiations provision was 
offered by Bulow and Klemperer (1996).  They emphasize the competitive 
advantages of these procedures, and hence ignore the issues of adaptation due to 
changes.      
 
 
 
 
 
51 
 
References 
Bajari,  Patrick  and  Tadelis,  Steven  (2001)  ―Incentives  Versus  Transaction  
Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts.‖ RAND Journal of Economics, 
Autumn 32(3) pp.  387-407. 
Bajari,  Patrick,  Houghton,  Stephanie and Tadelis,  Steven (2006) ―Bidding for 
Incomplete Contracts,‖ working paper, University of Michigan and UC Berkeley. 
Baker, George (1992) ―Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement,‖ 
Journal of Political Economy  100:598-614  
Banerjee, Abhijit V. Duflo, Esther, ―Reputation Effects and the Limits of 
Contracting: A Study of the Indian Software Industry‖,  Quarterly Journal of 
Economics v115, n3 (August 2000):  989-1017. Bartholomew, Stuart H. (1998)  
Construction Contracting:  Business and Legal Principles, Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
Bangladesh Forms 2908 
Bangladesh Forms 2911 
Central procurement technical unit (CPTU), Bangladesh) 
Chakravarty, Surajeet and MacLeod, W. Bentley (2004) ―On the E?ciency of 
Standard 
Choice:   Evidence  from  Offshore  Drilling,‖  Journal  of  Law,  Economics,  and  
Organization 20 (1):230-260. 
Clough, R. and Sears, G.  Construction Contracting, New York:  Wiley, 1994. 
 
 
52 
 
Corts,  Kenneth   and   Jasjit Singh  (2004)  ―The  Effect   of Relationships   on 
Contract 
Form Contracts:  The Case of Construction,‖ USC CLEO Research Paper No.  
C04- 17. 
Hester, Weston T., John A. Kuprenas, and T.C. Chang, (1991) ―Construction 
Changes and Change  Orders:    Their Magnitude  and Impact,‖      The 
Construction Industry Institute, Austin, Texas. 
Levin, Jonathan and Tadelis, Steven (2006), working paper, Stanford University 
and UC Berkeley. 
McAfee,  R.  Preston  and  McMillan,  John  (1986)  ―Bidding for  Contracts:    A  
Principal Agent Analysis‖ Rand Journal of Economics, Vol.  17:326-38. 
Public Procurement Rules-2008 
Steven Tadelis University of California Berkeley Haas School of Business Patrick 
Bajari University of Michigan Department of Economics January, 2006. 
―Incentives and Award Procedures: Competitive Tendering vs. Negotiations in 
Procurement‖  
The Public Procurement Act’ 2006 
The Public Procurement Regulations 2003  
Williamson, Oliver E. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York: Free 
Press,  1985. 
 
